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We discuss the robustness of two-way quantum communication protocols against Trojan horse
attack and introduce a novel attack, delay-photon Trojan horse attack. Moreover, we present a
practical way for two-way quantum communication protocols to prevent the eavesdropper from
stealing the information transmitted with Trojan horse attacks. It means that two-way quantum
communication protocols is also secure in a practical application.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Dd
Quantum communication supplies some novel ways
for the transmission of message, such as quantum key
distribution (QKD) [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7], quantum se-
cure direct communication (QSDC) [8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
13, 14, 15, 16, 17], quantum secret sharing (QSS)
[18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27], and so on. QKD
provides a secure way for creating a private key with
which two remote parties, say Alice and Bob, can com-
municate in an unconditionally secure way even though
an eavesdropper, Eve is monitoring the channel. After
Bennett and Brassard published their pioneering work
[1] in 1984, called BB84, QKD attracts a lot of atten-
tions [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] and becomes one of the most
mature applications of quantum information.
QSS and QSDC are two important branches of quan-
tum communication, and have been developing quickly
in recent years. QSS is the generalization of classical
secret sharing [28] into quantum scenario and supplies
a secure way for sharing both a piece of classical infor-
mation [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23] and quantum information
[24, 25, 26, 27]. The gents can obtain the message sent by
the sender only when they cooperate, otherwise they can
get nothing. QSDC is used to transmit the secret mes-
sage directly [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14] without creating a
private key and then encrypting the message.
Recently, there are some two-way protocols proposed
for QKD [5, 6, 7], QSS [20, 27], and QSDC [8, 9, 10, 11,
12, 13, 14]. Although there are differences among par-
ticular quantum communication protocols, almost all of
them include the following procedures [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 13, 14, 20, 27]. First, the receiver of information,
say Bob, prepares the quantum signal randomly in one
of some nonorthogonal states or a mixed state, and sends
it to the sender Alice. Alice chooses one of two modes,
checking mode and coding mode, to deal with the quan-
tum signal. If Alice chooses the checking mode, she will
obtain a sample for eavesdropping check with the mea-
surement on the signal, otherwise she operates the sig-
nal with local unitary operations and sends it back to
Bob. Bob measures the signal and gets the information
transmitted by Alice. There are at least two transmis-
sions of the quantum signal, i.e., from Bob to Alice, and
from Alice to Bob. These two-way quantum communi-
cation protocols can be attacked with a Trojan horse if
the two parties use only a simple way for eavesdropping
check. On the other hand, this class of attacks can be de-
tected with a little of modification in the eavesdropping
checks. In this paper, we will discuss three types of Tro-
jan horse attacks on two-way quantum communication
protocols and present a way for improving their secu-
rity against those attacks with a photon number splitter
(PNS: 50/50) and a wavelength filter.
The typical two-way quantum key distribution proto-
col can be described as follows with polarized single pho-
tons [5, 6].
(1) Bob prepares a polarized single photon in one of
the four states {| + z〉, | − z〉, | + x〉, | − x〉} randomly.
Here
|+ z〉 = |0〉, (1)
| − z〉 = |1〉, (2)
|+ x〉 =
1
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), (3)
| − x〉 =
1
2
(|0〉 − |1〉), (4)
and {| + z〉, | − z〉} are the two eigenstates of σz , and
{|+ x〉, | − x〉} are those of σx.
(2) Bob sends the photon to Alice, and Alice chooses
one of the two modes to deal with it. If she chooses
checking mode, Alice measures the photon with one of
the two measuring bases (MBs), σz and σx, randomly.
If she chooses the coding mode, she operates the photon
with one of the two unitary operations I and U . Here I =
|0〉〈0|+|1〉〈1| is the identity matrix and U = |0〉〈1|−|1〉〈0|.
The nice feature of the U operation [5, 9] is that it flips
the state in both measuring bases, i,e,
U{|+ z〉, | − z〉} = {−| − z〉, |+ z〉}, (5)
U{|+ x〉, | − x〉} = {| − x〉,−|+ x〉}. (6)
(3) Alice sends the photon operated to Bob, and Bob
measures it with the same MB as that he prepares it.
2(4) Alice and Bob repeat the process until they obtain
enough key bits.
(5) Alice and Bob analyze the error rate of the samples
obtained with the checking mode. Moreover they pick
out randomly a subset of the outcomes obtained by Bob
for eavesdropping check.
(6) If they can determine that the quantum channel is
secure, they do error correction and privacy amplification
on the outcomes to distill a private key.
In fact, this QKD protocol is equivalent to two BB84
QKD protocol if the eavesdropper Eve does not attack it
with a Trojan horse. The latter is proven unconditionally
secure [29]. If the QKD protocol is robust against Trojan
horse attacks, it is also secure.
Now, let us introduce the three types of Trojan horse
attacks. The first one is the general Trojan horse attack
introduced in Ref. [2]. That is, Eve sends a light pulse to
Alice, same as Bob. The second is a new one, the delay-
photon Trojan horse attack. In detail, Eve intercepts the
signal transmitted from Bob to Alice, and then inserts a
fake photon in the signal with a delay time, shorter than
the time windows [2]. In this way, Alice cannot detect
this fake photon as it does not click Alice’s detector. Af-
ter the operation done by Alice, Eve intercepts the signal
again and separates the fake photon. She can get the full
information about Alice’s operation with measurement.
The third Trojan horse attack is the invisible photon at-
tack proposed by Cai recently [30]. Its main idea is that
Eve inserts an invisible photon in each signal prepared
by Bob and sends it to Alice. As Alice’s detector can-
not click this photon and performs an unitary operation
on each signal, Eve can steal the information about Al-
ice’s operation by means that she intercepts the signal
operated and separates the invisible photon from each
signal. With the measurement on the invisible photon,
Eve can read out Alice’s information. Its implement may
be resort to the second attack strategy as it is necessary
for Eve to separate the invisible photon from the signal
without destroying the original photon.
In essence, the security of quantum communication
protocol comes from the fact that the authorized users
can detect the eavesdropper with measurements on some
samples. For the third Trojan horse attack proposed by
Cai [30], Alice needs only to add a wavelength filter [2]
on each signal before she deals with it (i.e. coding or
measuring it). In practical quantum communication, Al-
ice and Bob should exploit a wavelength filter to filtering
the light from background, in particular in free space. So
there is no problem for the users to deal with this attack.
For the delay-photon Trojan horse attack, Alice should
use a PNS to divide each sample signal into two pieces
and measure them with two MBs. If there is only one
photon in the original signal, Alice can only get one out-
come, otherwise she will obtain two outcomes. In this
way, Alice can improve the security of two-way quan-
tum communication protocols against the Trojan horse
attacks. Obviously, the method is also efficient for Al-
ice to avoid the first Trojan horse attack. In practical,
photon number splitting technique is not easy to be im-
plemented with current technology [2], a photon beam
splitter (PBS: 50/50) which is not difficult to be made
can be used to replace the PNS . If the time windows of
the two single-photon devices is long enough, Alice can
detect the eavesdropping with a multi-photon fake signal.
In summary, a PBS and a wavelength filter can be used
to avoid the two-way quantum key distribution protocol
against Trojan horse attacks. The same result can be
drawn for the other two-way quantum communication
protocols, such as QSS [20, 27] and QSDC [8, 9, 10, 11,
12, 13, 14] protocols.
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